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There have been a number of econometric studies of the effect of changes in management
and control on the productivity and employment of private, but not of public, enterprises. This
paper examines the impact of changes in political administration on the productivity and
employment of the entire executive branch of the U.S. government using data compiled under
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Federal Productivity Measurement Program. The estimates
indicate that the mean rate of productivity growth in the first year of administrations is 2.6 times
as high as the mean growth in subsequent years. Also, employment growth is strictly increasing
with respect to the administration’s tenure: 95% of federal employment growth during the period
1967-94 occurred in the fourth or later years of political administrations, although administrations
were that old only 36% of the time. These findings are broadly consistent with evidence about
the private sector. They suggest that the inauguration of a new administration initially purges
the executive branch, but as an administration’s tenure increases, fat and inefficiency tend to
accumulate.
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and NBERPrevious research has indicated that changes in the
management and control of private enterprises have significant
effects on their productivity and employment. Lichtenberg and
Siegel (1987, 1990a) found that the productivity of manufacturing
plants increased significantly (relative to average industry
productivity) afier a change in ownership or leveraged buyout.
They also found (1990b) that changes in ownership were
associated with substantial reductions in the employment of
(relatively highly-paid) white-collar workers in corporate
headquarters and other “auxiliary establishments” (but not in the
employment of production workers).
The executive branch of the Federal government, which
employs almost 3 million people, undergoes regular changes in
leadership and control: there is a presidential election eve~ four
years. Although there are many important differences between the
private and public sectors, the hypothesis that control changes
have similar effects on productivity and employment in the two
sectors is a plausible one. 1 However we are not aware of any
‘ Recent research (Lichtenberg (1993) and Lehr and Lichtenberg (1996))
suggests that the introduction of information technology has similar
effects on productivity in business and government.previous econometric research on the impact of changes in
administration on executive branch productivity and employment.
The lack of existing evidence about the effect of changes
in administration on government productivity is not surprising,
given the general absence of data on the output and productivity
of government enterprises. But thanks to the Federal Productivity
Measurement Program (FPMP) conducted by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics from 1967 to 1994 (which has unfortunately now
been terminated), annual time-series data on executive branch
productivity and employment are available, and it is possible to
investigate whether leadership changes have similar effects in the
private and public sectors.
Under this program, Federal Government agencies
annually submit workload counts (outputs), employment and
compensation data, along with descriptions of their workloads and
other related information to the BLS. BLS also obtains some data
from annual reports, budgets, or Congressional hearings. In 1994
the FPMP covered over two million Federal civilian employees
working in 255 organizations within 60 Federal agencies. About
2500 different products and semices were measured by the4
program.2 BLS does not publish organization- or agency-level
data, but it does publish series for the “measured portion” of the
Federal government as a whole, and by “fi.mction,” for 24
government finctions, such as audit of operations, loans and
grants, and medical services. We will examine the effect of
changes in administration on productivity and employment on the
total measured portion of the Federal govemment.3
Summary statistics on annual rates of productivity, output,
and employment growth for the entire measured portion of the
Federal government during the period 1967-94 are presented
below (the data were obtained from Table 1 of BLS Summary 96-
3, “Federal Government Productivity Highlights, 1967-94”):
2See Forte (199) and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1994, 1996) for
detailed discussions of the Federal productivity data.
3The output series compiled under the FPMP reflect ~ activities of
the organizations being measured, that is, the outputs used by groups
outside the organization. Not all outputs, however, are fial to the
Federal government in that some measured outputs (e.g., maintenance,
personnel, and supply) are used by other government organizations.
Thus, the FPMP summary statistics reflect the productivity of the
measured organizations, not the Federal government as a whole.
Measured productivity may perhaps be regarded as the sum of true
productivity and a classical (“white-noise”) measurement error. If this
error is uncorrelated with changes in administration, our estimates of the
effect of the latter will be unbiased.mean s.d, min max
P l.lO/O 1.270 -2.8Y0 2,970
~ 1,4 1.2 -2.0 3.7




The average annual rate of labor productivity growth--the
difference between the rate of output growth (1.4Yo)and the rate
of employment growth (O.30/0)--was 1.10/O.There is some
evidence of slowdown in Federal productivity: average rates of
productivity and output growth during the last seven years of the
period (1987-94) were only 0,4% and 0.6Y0, respectively.
We are interested in examining the relationship between
government productivity and employment grotih and the “age”
of the political administration, At. The latter was defined to be
equal to 1 in the first year following each presidential election
(1969, 1973,.,,, 1993), to 2 in the second year, and so forth, The
years 1985-88 were treated as years 5-8 of the Reagan6
administration. Time-series data for & p, and I are presented in
Table 1.
Figure 1 is a chart of the mean annual rate of executive
branch productivity growth, by year of political administration.
(Since only the Reagan administration lasted more than four years,
obsewations for which A exceeded four are grouped into a single
catego~ (5+ years).) The rate of productivity growth in the first
year is much higher than it is in subsequent years, but there is
essentially no relationship between p and A for A z 2. The null
hypothesis that these five mean growth rates are identical can be
rejected at only about the 20°/0 significance level. However, as
the following regression reveals, the difference between mean
productivity growth in the first year and mean productivity growth
in years 2 through 8 is highly statistically significant (t-statistics in
parentheses):
p,= 90.7 + 1.21 FIRSTYEAR.t -.045 t +~
(1.76) (2.48) (1.74)
R2 = .285
where FIRSTYEARt = 1 if& = 1, and otherwise equals zero, and
Q is the residual. This implies that productivity growth in the first7
year of an administration tends to be 1.2 percentage points higher
than it is afier the first year, Since the average rate of productivity
growth is 1.1Yo,the annual rate of productivi~ growth i)zthefirst
year is 2.6 times as high as it is in subsequent years; over 40% of
all government productivity growth occurs in the first year of
political administrations.
Next we consider the relationship between total executive
branch employment growth and the “age” or year of the
administration. Figure 2 is a chart of mean employment growth
by year of administration. It indicates that the rate of employment
growth is strictly increasing with respect to age. During the first
year the administration is in office, employment typically declines
by 0.6V0. In subsequent years, the rate of employment growth
increases, and reaches 0.So/O in year 4 and 1.0°/0in years 5-8. The
null hypothesis that these five growth rates are equal can be
rejected at the 7°/0significance level. These figures indicate that
95% offederal employment growth during the period 1967-94
occurred in the fourth or later years of political administrations,
although administrations were that old only 36% of the time. 4
442% of federal employment growth occurred in the fifth or later years;
administrations were that old only 14°/0of the time8
Figure 2 suggests that it is reasonable to postulate that
employment growth depends on the logarithm of A, so we
estimated the following regression:
1, = -0.44 + 0.82 log(AI) + v,
(1.46) (3.09)
R2 = .276
(We tried including t and the log of employment in year t- 1 as
regressors, but these variables were insignificant and had almost
no effect on the estimate of the log(&) coefficient.) There is a
significant positive relationship between employment growth and
the age of the administration.
One possible interpretation of these results is that the
inauguration of a new administration initially purges the system--
much like new management may purge a company--and places the
government on a diet, restraining employment growth without
sacrificing much output. (Some authors have suggested that
external shocks other than leadership changes may reduce “fat” or
“X-ineficiency” in corporations. Borenstein and Farrell (1996)
hypothesize that sharp decreases in crude oil prices may have this
effect on oil companies, and Scherer (1992) and others argue thatincreases in foreign competition may have this effect on
manufacturing companies,) But as an administration’s tenure
increases, waste, inefficiency, and fat tend to accumulate in the
executive branch.10
Table 1
Time-Series Data on Age of Political Administration and
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